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STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. WHETHER THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

2. WHETHER THE BOARD OP REVIEW'S DECISION IS WITHIN THE
LIMITS OP REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALITY.

iii

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was employed as a truck driver for May
Trucking Company (May) in Layton, Utah, from 20
1984 to 19 December, 1985.

September,

(R. at 37). Appellant's job

function was to perform cross-country driving for May,

On or

about 20 December, 1985> after Appellant returned from an
assignment, May discovered that on that trip the road speed
governor on Appellant's truck had been tampered with. (R. at
39).

The governor is normally set at approximately sixty-two

miles per hour (62 mph). (R. at 39). The Rockwell trip
master computer on board the truck showed that the Appellant
had averaged 4 or 5 miles per hour over the governor's limit
on the last trip, (R. at 41). May had an incentive bonus
program which provided that if a driver drove under 60, that
driver got a three cent per mile additional bonus, and
Appellant had received that bonus quite often. (R. at 42).
The daily trip reports also showed that from 21 November,
1985 to 22 November, 1985, Appellant had driven approximately
21 1/2 hours out of 24 hours. (R. at 44).
Both the tampering with the road governor and the
excessive driving time were violations of May's company
policy by Appellant.

Although these violations could result

in termination, Appellant was merely suspended from work
because of his exemplary driving record. (R. at 9, 24, 48,
69).

As a condition to returning to work Appellant was

required to submit to a urinalysis test. (R. at 69). May
felt that petitioner could not have driven for the sustained
1

period without some type of chemical assistance. (R. at 46).
The urinalysis showed a trace of marijuana in Appellant's
system. (R. at 9* 46). Appellant was terminated at that
point by May.
Appellant filed for unemployment benefits and was
denied on 24 January, 1986. Appellant requested and had a
hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on 19
February, 1986. (R. at 9).

In a written opinion, the ALJ

found that Appellant was not discharged for disqualifying
reasons and allowed unemployment benefits. (R. at 11). The
ALJ's decision was based partly on the fact that Appellant's
violations of the speed and hour policies would not alone
have resulted in termination. (R. at 10). Although the ALJ
found the employer was justified in its drug policy, the ALJ
found insufficient evidence to support May's claim that
Appellant understood that any use of drugs would result in
termination (R. at 10). Appellant testified that he
understood he could only be terminated if drug use influenced
his driving performance or if he used drugs in or around a
company vehicle. (R. at 10, 17). Petitioner also testified
that he had not consumed drugs for quite some time.

(R. at

25) y that he had not used drugs while driving (R. at 16, 26),
and that he was not a regular drug user. (R. at 17, 26).
Consequently, the ALJ allowed benefits.
On appeal by May to the Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission (Board) the ALJ's decision was
reversed. (R. at 6). The Board acknowledged insufficient
2

evidence as to a discharge based on drug usage. (R. at 6 ) .
The Board, however, felt that the speed and hour violations
occurring during Appellant's last trip for May were serious
enough, coupled with the drug usage, to warrant the discharge
of petitioner. (R. at 7).

The decision of the Board was

split with commissioners Hadley and Hannan reversing the ALJ,
and
commissioner Belka dissenting.

Commissioner Belka agreed

that the drug usage evidence was insufficient.

He felt,

however, that the violations of speed were not serious since
Appellant had averaged 66 mph, but the employer had
authorized speeds of 62 mph which also violated the law. (R.
at 8) .
After the Board's decision, Appellant filed a
notice of appeal.

The matter is now before this Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The standard of review for decisions of the Board
of Review is twofold.

The Board's findings of fact will not

be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.

In this

appeal the record shows that the ALJ's findings, not the
Board's findings, are supported by substantial evidence and
should be followed by this Court.

Those findings (the ALJ's)

indicate that Appellant was discharged for non-disqualifying
reasons and, thus, that Appellant is entitled to unemployment
benefits.
The conclusions of law made by the Board must be
reasonable and rational.

In this appeal, again, it is the
3

ALJfs conclusions that are reasonable and rational, not the
Board's conclusions.

The evidence shows that Appellant was

not discharged for just cause.

As to marijuana usage, both

the ALJ and the Board agree that Appellant was without the
knowledge requirement.

As to the tampering and excessive

driving time, the evidence supports the conclusion that
Appellant was without sufficient culpability.

Thus, the

conclusion that Appellant was discharged for just cause is
erroneous and the ALJ!s conclusion that Appellant was
discharged for non-disqualifying reasons should be
reinstated.
ARGUMENT
THERE ARE TWO STANDARDS OP REVIEW IN CASES OP THIS
TYPE WHICH ARE BASED ON THE RATIONALITY OP THE
BOARD OP REVIEW'S DECISION.
A.

THE STANDARD OP REVIEW FOR FACTUAL FINDINGS
OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS BASED ON STATUTE.

This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the
Commission and Board of Review if supported by evidence,
pursuant to §35-4-10(1) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended).

Trotta v. Department of Employment Security, 664

P.2d 1195 (Utah 1983).

The Board of Review (Board) did not

make written findings of fact; however, in its written
decision

there is no indication that it was not following

the findings of fact adopted by the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).

Consequently, this Court could conclude that the

Board incorporated the ALJfs findings of fact into its
decision.

The Board simply disagreed with the ALJfs

conclusions.
A

The Board did, however, dispute one finding of the
ALJ.

The ALJ found that Appellant was discharged because

traces of marijuana were found in his system.

The Board

found that Appellant was discharged on the basis of four
cumulative events:
1.

Alteration of the 62 MPH road speed governor;
and

2.

Evidence that the on-board computer showed
the truck had averaged 66 MPH; and

3.

Evidence that the truck had been operated
for 22 hours during a 24 hour period; and

4.

Applicant was tested and found to have traces
of marijuana in his system.

The difference is that the Board found Appellant was
discharged for reasons one through four, while the ALJ found
that Appellant was discharged only for reason four.

The ALJ

found that for reasons one through three, Appellant was
merely suspended.
This distinction is critical.

If the finding of

the ALJ is followed, then Appellant was not discharged for
disqualifying reasons and is entitled to unemployment
benefits.

Not only was this the decision of the ALJ, but it

also appears that the Board agreed with that consequence.
The Board, in its decision, acknowledged that there was very
likely insufficient evidence to show when Appellant had used
marijuana and what effects it had on Appellant if any.

The

only reason the Board reversed the ALJ, as stated previously,
5

was due to the cumulative facts rather than the marijuana
fact alone.

A close examination of the proceedings before

the ALJ, and certain other documents in the record, shows the
Board's finding is not based on substantial evidence. Trotta
v. Department of Employment Security, 664 P.2d 1195, 1198
(Utah 1983) (and cases there cited).
A letter dated 16 January, 1986 from Mr. Greg
Weigel, Personnel Manager of May Trucking, was received by
Appellant.

The letter first states that Appellant was

discharged for violating the safety regulations on logging
and driving time.

But apparently this is not why Appellant

was actually terminated, because the letter goes on to say
that Appellant was only suspended due to his previous good
driving record.

The letter makes it clear that Appellant was

terminated only after the urinalysis tested positive for
marijuana.

Thus, the letter is evidence that goes against

the Board's decision.
In the hearing before the ALJ, a representative
of the employer was asked what brought on the termination.
The representative responded that it was a combination of
things and then said, "Had it not been for the positive
results on the drug test, Mr. Grinnell probably would have
had a two-week suspension and then it would have been over
with."

After determining that the marijuana problem alone

was a ground for termination, the representative also stated
that tampering and excessive hours were also grounds for
termination.

But the point was reiterated that the violation
6

that brought on the termination was the marijuana test. The
testimony heard by the ALJ showed that Appellant was
terminated for marijuana usage.

Based on this and other

testimony, the ALJ found no knowledge on Appellant's part
and, thus, that he was not discharged for disqualifying
reasons.

This Court has held that because of the technical

experience of the ALJ, and the ALJ's ability to more closely
evaluate the testimony proffered, great deference should be
afforded to the ALJ's decision.
P.2d 1129, 1133 (Utah 1985).

Kehl v. Board of Review, 700

The testimony at the hearing,

then also goes against the Board's decision and supports the
ALJ's decision.
In conclusion, the ALJ's decision is supported by
substantial evidence.

The letter and the testimony both

support the ALJ's finding that Appellant was not discharged
for the tampering or traveling violations, but only for the
urinalysis results.

The Board's decision that Appellant was

discharged for the tampering or traveling violations is not
supported by substantial evidence.

Therefore, this Court

should follow the findings of the ALJ and not the Board, in
making its decision.
B.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE LEGAL STANDARDS
APPLIED BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW ARE BROADER
THAN THE REVIEW OF FACTUAL FINDINGS.

This Court has stated that it will not defer to the
legal standard applied by the Board of Review except under
legislative intent expressed in statutory language.

Trotta

v. Department of Employment Security, 664 P.2d 1195, 1198
7

(Utah 1983) • The court there stated that the review of the
legal standards applied by the Board of Review is
considerably broader than its review of the factual findings
of the Board,

L3. Yet, this Court has also stated that the

Board's decision shall be affirmed unless as a matter of law
only the opposite conclusion could be drawri from the facts.
Board of Education of Sevier County School District v. Board
of Review, 701 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1985) • It appears, then, that
the rule of review currently adopted by the court is that
stated in Wright's Furniture Mill, Inc. v. Industrial
Commission, 707 P.2d 113 (1985).

There the court deferred to

the ALJfs application of law to fact so long as the decision
is "reasonable and rational."

In the instant case, based on

his technical expertise or more extensive Experience in the
administrative agency, the ALJ concluded that Appellant had
not been discharged for disqualifying reasons. This
conclusion is well documented in the ALJ!s decision. The
evidence was clear that Appellant did not meet the knowledge
standard required for a finding of discharge for just cause.
The legal conclusion is clear that absent knowledge,
culpability and control, the claimant is not disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits. Uta)h Department of
Employment Security Rule A71-07-1:5(H)-1 •
1.

The ALJ?S Decison That Appellant Was
Without The Requisite Knowledge Was
Reasonable and Rational.

The ALJ, after finding that Appellant was
discharged because of the urinalysis test results, turned to
8

the question of whether Appellant was discharged for just
cause,

A determination of just cause is based on the three

factors of knowledge, culpability and control.
A71-07-1:5(H)-1.

Rule

All three factors must be present to

establish just cause. The ALJ found that in this case the
factor of knowledge was missing and therefore Appellant was
not discharged for just cause.
The employer testified that it was company policy
to discharge for any use of drugs whether on or off the road,
and that Appellant knew this.

Appellant, however, testified

that he did not know any use was grounds for discharge,
although he knew that use while driving or while around the
truck was grounds for discharge.

He also testified that he

had not used marijuana for quite some time, and that even
then he did not use it regularly.

The ALJ found that there

was insufficient evidence to support the employer's position
and thus found that Appellant had not been shown to have the
required knowledge for a just cause discharge.

This legal

conclusion is fully substantiated by the evidence and should
not be disturbed by this Court.
2.

The Board's Decision That Appellant Was
Disqualified From Receiving Unemployment
Benefits is Not Reasonable Nor Rational.

The Board agreed that the evidence on marijuana
usage was insufficient to establish knowledge and so just
cause, but found disqualifying behavior in the tampering and
traveling time.

As has been discussed, this finding of the

Board is not supported by substantial evidence, and is also
9

reversible as a misapplication of the law.
The Board concluded that because Appellant could
have been terminated for the tampering and traveling time
violations he was terminated for just cause.
is in error.

This conclusion

First, the two violations do not result in

mandatory discharge as evidenced by the employer's testimony
that Appellant was only suspended for those violations. The
Board cannot decide for the employer that discharge was
warranted when the employer has already made the decision not
to discharge Appellant.

Second, although not couched in this

specific language, Appellant's conduct fails to meet the
culpability requirement of a discharge for just cause.
The issue of culpability starts with a
consideration of the seriousness of the conduct as it affects
continuance of the employment relationship.

The Department

of Employment Security's rules state in part:
(1) Longevity and prior work record are
important in determining if the act or
omission is an isolated incident or a
good faith error in judgment. An employee
who has historically complied with work
rules does not demonstrate by a single
violation, even though harmful, that such
violations will be repeated and therefore
require discharge to avoid future harm to
the employer...
Rule A71-07-l:5(H)-l.B.l.a.(l).
This is precisely the situation involved in the instant case.
By the employer's own admission, Appellant had an exemplary
work record.

Thus, Appellant was put on suspension and not

discharged.

The Board found that the tampering and traveling

time violations were violations occurring on the last trip
10

Appellant made for the employer, I.e. a single violation.
Thus, the element of fault is lacking.

Even though

Appellant's conduct might be grounds for discharge, without
fault it is not sufficient for disqualification of
unemployment benefits.
Review,

P.2d

Logan Regional Hospital v. Board of

, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (August 5,

1986).
It should also be noted what the Department of
Transportation's remedy is for traveling time violations. 49
C.F.R. §395.13(a) declares that the Federal Highway
Administration's special agent can declare a driver out of
service.

The agent must also contact the motor carrier and

advise it of that fact.

The motor carrier cannot allow an

out of service driver to operate a motor vehicle until the
driver complies with the rules.

§395-3 provides the maximum

driving and on-duty time allowable.

To be back in-service

th<% driver only needs to take one week off if such driver has
been on duty more than 60 hours in the last seven (7)
consecutive days.

Or if the driver has driven more than ten

(10) hours or been on duty more than fifteen (15) hours, such
driver must take eight (8) consecutive hours off duty.

Once

that is accomplished the driver can be released from being
out of service.

§395 .13(c)(1)(1) . The policy is not to keep

worn-out drivers off the road, but to assure that drivers on
the road are fully rested.

Since Appellant was suspended for

at least one week, he would have had plenty of time to rest
up to get back on the road.

This is another reason why the

Board's decision is not reasonable or rational.

CONCLUSION
Because the ALJ's findings are supported by
substantial evidence, and because the ALJ's decision is
according to the law, the Board of Review1s decision should
be reversed since it is not supported by the evidence nor is
it reasonable or rational.

The ALJ's decision should be

reinstated.
DATED this^lTJlday of August, 1986.
Respectfully Submitted

io
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(i) Within ten days after the decision of the board
be set up by the commission, in accordance with
of review has become final, any aggrieved party may: ! accepted actuarial principles on the basis of statistics
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DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY —

RULES AND REGULATIONS

35-4-5(b) DISCHARGE
Section 35-4-5:
"An i n d i v i d u a l shall be i n e l i g i b l e f o r
benefits or f o r purposes of e s t a b l i s h i n g a w a i t i n g p e r i o d :
(b)(1) For the week in which he has been discharged f o r
j u s t cause or for an act or omission i n connection w i t h
employment, not c o n s t i t u t i n g a crime, which i s d e l i b e r a t e ,
w i l l f u l , or wanton and adverse to the employer's r i g h t f u l
i n t e r e s t , i f so found by the commission, and t h e r e a f t e r
u n t i l the claimant has earned an amount equal to at l e a s t
six times the c l a i m a n t ' s weekly b e n e f i t amount i n bona
f i d e covered employment."

L

GENERAL DEFINITION

) r d i n a r i l y accepted concepts of j u s t i c e are used i n determining i f a discharge
is d i s q u a l i f y i n g under the " j u s t cause" provisions of the A c t . Just cause i s
defined as a job separation that is necessary due to the seriousness of actual
or potential harm to the employer provided the claimant had knowledge of the
employer's expectations and had control over the circumstances which led to
the discharge. Just cause i s not established i f the reason f o r the discharge i s
baseless, a r b i t r a r y or capricous or the employer has f a i l e d to uniformly apply
reasonable standards to a l l employees when i n s t i t u t i n g d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n .
The purpose of t h i s section i s to deny b e n e f i t s to i n d i v i d u a l s who bring about
t h e i r own unemployment by conducting themselves, with respect to t h e i r employment
with callousness, misbehavior, or lack of consideration to such a degree t h a t
the empl oyer was j u s t i f i e d i n discharging the employee. However, when an employee
is discharged by his employer, such discharge may have been the r e s u l t of
incompetence, lack of s k i l l , or other reasons which ar6 beyond the c l a i m a n t ' s
c o n t r o l . The question which must be established by the evidence i s whether the
claimant i s at f a u l t i n his r e s u l t i n g unemployment.
Unemployment insurance
benefits w i l l be denied i f the employer had j u s t cause for discharging the
employee. However, not e^ery cause for discharge provides a basis to deny
b e n e f i t s . In order to have j u s t cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35-45(b)(1) there must be some f a u l t on the part of the employee i n v o l v e d .
B.

JUST CAUSE

1. The basic factors which establish just cause, and are essential
determination of ineligibility are:
a.

for a

Culpability

This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the offense
as it affects continuance of the employment relationship. The discharge must
have been necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful
interests. A discharge would not be considered "necessary" if it is not consistent
with reasonable employment practices. The wrongness of the conduct must be
considered in the context of the particular employment and how it affects the
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employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and
there is no expectation that the conduct will be continued or repeated, potential
harm may not be shown and therefore it 1s not necessary to discharge the employee.
(1) Longevity and prior work record are Important 1n determining 1f
the act or omission is an isolated incident or a good faith error in judgement.
An employee who has historically complied with work rules does not demonstrate
by a single violation, even though harmful, that such violations will be repeated
and therefore require discharge to avoid future harm to the employer. For example:
A long term employee who does not have a history of tardiness or absenteeism 1s
absent without leave for a number of days due to a death in his immediate family.
Although this is a violation of the employer's rules and may establish just
cause for discharging a new employee, the fact that the employee has established
over a long period of time that he complies with attendance rules shows that the
circumstance is more of an isolated incident rather than a violation of the
rules that is or could be exptected to be habitual.
In this case, because
the potential for harm to the employer is not shown, It 1s not necessary for the
employer to discharge the employee, and therefore just cause is not established.
b.

Knowledge

The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the
employer expected.
It is not necessary that the claimant Intended to cause
harm to the employer, but he should reasonably have been able to anticipate the
effect his conduct would have. Knowledge may not be established unless the
employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a pertinent
written policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation of a universal
standard of behavior.
If the employer's expectations are unclear, ambiguous
or inconsistent, the existence of knowledge is not shown. A specific warning
is one way of showing that the employee had knowledge of the expected conduct.
After the employee is given a warning he should be given an opportunity to
correct objectionable conduct. Additional violations occurring after the warning would be necessary to establish just cause for a discharge.
(1) For Example:
When the employer has an established procedure of
progressive discipline, such procedures generally must have been followed in
order to establish that the employee had knowledge of the expected behavior or
the seriousness of the act. The exception is that wery severe conduct may justify
immediate discharge without following a progressive disciplinary program.
c.

Control

The conduct must have
claimant to control or prevent.

been

within

the

power

and

capacity

of

the

2.
Just cause may not be established when the reason for discharge Is based
on such things as mere mistakes, inefficiency, failure of performance as the
result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence in isolated Instances, goodfaith errors in judgment or in the exercise of discretion, minor but casual or
unintentional carelessness or negligence, etc. These examples of conduct are
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alifying because of the lack of knowledge or control. However, continI inefficiency, repeated carelessness, or lack of care exercised by ordinary,
isonable workers in similar circumstances, may be disqualifying depending on
» reason and degree of the carelessness, the knowledge and control of the
)loyee.
3, The term " j u s t cause" as used i n Section 5(b)(1) does not lessen the
luirement t h a t there be some f a u l t on the part of the employee i n v o l v e d ,
ior to the 1983 a d d i t i o n of the term " j u s t cause" the Commission i n t e r p r e t e d
: t i o n 5(b)(1) to require an i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n of harm or i n t e n t i o n a l
sregard of the employer's i n t e r e s t s . The i n t e n t of the L e g i s l a t u r e in addg the words " j u s t cause" t o Section 5(b)(1) was apparently to c o r r e c t t h i s
s t r i c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . While some f a u l t must be present, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t
at the acts were intended, the consequences were reasonably foreseeable, and
at such acts have serious e f f e c t on the employee's job or the employer's
terests.
BURDEN OF PROOF
1 . In a discharge, the employer i n i t i a t e s the separation and, as such, i s
le primary source of information with regard to the reasons f o r the d i s m i s s a l .
\e employer has the burden of proof which i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h
le facts r e s u l t i n g i n the discharge. The employer i s required by the Statute
I Section 3 5 - 4 - l l ( g ) to keep accurate records and to provide correct informalon to the Department f o r proper administration of the Act.
Although the
nployer has the burden to e s t a b l i s h j u s t cause f o r the discharge, i f s u f f i c i e n t
acts are obtained from the claimant, a decision w i l l be made based on the
iformation a v a i l a b l e .
The f a i l u r e of one party to provide information does
ot necessarily r e s u l t i n a r u l i n g favorable to the other p a r t y .
2. A l l interested p a r t i e s have the r i g h t to give r e b u t t a l
ontrary to the i n t e r e s t s of t h a t p a r t y .

to

information

QUIT OR DISCHARGE
he determination of whether a separation is a q u i t or a discharge i s made by the
epartment based on the circumstances which resulted i n the separation. The
onclusions on the employer's records, the separation notice or the c l a i m a n t ' s
eport are not c o n t r o l l i n g on the Department.
1.

Discharge Before E f f e c t i v e Date of Resignation.

When an i n d i v i d u a l n o t i f i e s an employer t h a t he intends to leave as of a
l e f i n i t e date i n the f u t u r e and i s discharged p r i o r to t h a t date, the cause f o r
.he separation on the day the separation takes place i s the c o n t r o l l i n g f a c t o r
in determining whether i t was a q u i t or discharge.
Although the separation
night have been motivated by the c l a i m a n t ' s announced r e s i g n a t i o n , the employer
•/as the moving party i n ending the employment p r i o r to the resignation date,
rherefore, the immediate reason was more closely r e l a t e d to the employer's
action than to the c l a i m a n t ' s announced i n t e n t i o n to q u i t . Unless d i s q u a l i f y i n g
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conduct is involved, the separation is considered to be for the convenience of
the employer. However, if the employee is merely relieved of work responsibly
lities but is paid through the date of his announced resignation, it is not
a discharge, but a quit.
2.

Leaving In Anticipation of Discharge.

When an employee leaves work in anticipation of a possible discharge or
layoff, and if the reason for the discharge would not be disqualifying, the separation is generally considered to be a voluntary quit. However, an Individual
who leaves work to avoid virtually certain discharge for disqualifying conduct
cannot thereby avoid the disqualifying provisions of Section 35-4-5(b), and
the separation is considered a discharge rather than voluntary leaving.
3.

Employee Knows His Action Will Result in Discharge

Absences taken without permission, or other actions contrary to specific
unreasonable instructions from the employer, are generally considered a voluntary separation rather than discharge, if the worker was given a choice of
complying or being separated.
E.

DISCIPLINARY SUSPENSION OR INVOLUNTARY FURLOUGH

When an employee is put on a disciplinary suspension or involuntary furlough, he may meet the definition of "unemployed".
If the claimant files
during the suspension or furlough, the reason for the suspension or furlough
must be adjudicated as a discharge, even though the claimant is still attached
to the employer and expects to return to work. A suspension which was reasonable and necessary to prevent potential harm to the employer or to maintain
necessary dicipline would generally result in a disqualification under this
section provided the elements of control and knowledge are present. Failure
to return to work at the end of the definite period of suspension or furlough
would be considered a voluntary quit and eligibility would then be determined
consistent with Section 35-4-5(a), if the claimant had not been previously
denied.
F.

PROXIMAL CAUSE ~

Relation of Offense to Discharge

1. The cause for discharge is that conduct which motivates the employer to
make the decision to terminate the employee's services. If the decision has
truly been made, it is generally demonstrated by way of notice to the employee
or the initiation of a personnel action. Although the employer may learn of
other offenses following the making of the decision to terminate, the reason
for the discharge is limited to that conduct of which the employer was aware
prior to making the decision. However, if the employer discharges a person
because of some preliminary evidence of certain conduct, but does not obtain
all of the proof of the conduct until after the separation notice is given, it
could still be concluded that the discharge was caused by that conduct which
the employer was investigating. Eligibility for benefits will then be determined by considering the extent of culpability, knowledge and control.
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2. When the discharge does not occur Immediately a f t e r the employer becomes
are of an offense, a presumption arises t h a t there were other reasons for the
scharge. This r e l a t i o n s h i p between the offense and the discharge must be
tablished both as to cause and time. The presumption that the conduct was
t the cause of the discharge may be overcome by a showing t h a t the delay was
3 to such things as i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a r b i t r a t i o n , or hearings conducted w i t h
gard to the employee's conduct. When a grievance or a r b i t r a t i o n i s pending
th respect to the discharge, the Department's decision w i l l be based on the
formation available to the Department.
The Department's decision i s not
nding on the grievance r e s o l u t i o n process or an a r b i t r a t o r and the decision
the a r b i t r a t o r i s not binding on the Department. When an employer i s faced
th the necessity of a reduction i n his workforce but uses an employee's p r i o r
nduct as the c r i t e r i a for determining who w i l l be layed o f f , the lack of work
the primary motivation or cause of the discharge, not the conduct.
IN CONNECTION WITH EMPLOYMENT
D i s q u a l i f y i n g conduct i s not l i m i t e d to offenses which take place on the
iployer's premises or during business hours.
I t Is only necessary t h a t the
nduct have such "connection" to the employee's duties and to the employer's
siness that i t i s a subject of l e g i t i m a t e and s i g n i f i c a n t concern to the
iployer. A l l employers, both public and p r i v a t e have the r i g h t to expect
iployees to r e f r a i n from acts which are detrimental to the business or would
ing dishonor on the business name or the i n s t i t u t i o n . Legitimate I n t e r e s t s
employers i n c l u d e , but are not l i m i t e d t o : goodwill of customers, reputaon of the business, e f f i c i e n c y , business costs, morale of employees, d i s c i i n e , honesty, t r u s t and l o y a l t y .
EXAMPLES OF REASONS FOR DISCHARGE
\ a l l the f o l l o w i n g examples, the basic elements of j u s t cause must be consid*ed in determining e l i g i b i l i t y for b e n e f i t s . The f o l l o w i n g examples do not
lclude a l l reasons for discharge.
1.

V i o l a t i o n of Company Rules

an employee v i o l a t e s reasonable rules of the employer and the three elements
c u l p a b i l i t y , knowledge and control are e s t a b l i s h e d , b e n e f i t s must be denied.
a. The reasonableness of the employer's rules w i l l depend on the necesi t y for such a rule as i t a f f e c t s the employer's i n t e r e s t s .
Rules which are
3ntrary to general public p o l i c y or which i n f r i n g e upon the recognized r i g h t s
id p r i v i l e g e s of i n d i v i d u a l s may not be reasonable.
An employer must have
roader prerogatives i n regulating conduct when employees are on the job than
len they are not. An employer must be able to make rules f o r employee on-the3b conduct t h a t reasonably f u r t h e r the l e g i t i m a t e business i n t e r e s t s of the
uployer. An employer i s not required to Impose only minimum standards, but
here may be some j u s t i f i a b l e cause f o r v i o l a t i o n s of rules t h a t are unreasonable
r unduly harsh, rigorous or exacting. When rules are changed, adequate notice
nd reasonable opportunity to comply must be afforded. I f the employee believes
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a rule is unreasonable, he has the responsibility to discuss his concerns with
the employer and give the employer an opportunity to take corrective action;
b. Discharges
bargaining agreement.
employee's conduct was
discharge was contrary

may be regulated by an employment contract or collective
Just cause for the discharge is not established if the
consistent with his rights under such contract or the
to the provisions of such contract.

c. Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying conduct if it is found
that the act was condoned by the employer or was so prevalent as to be customary.
However, when the worker is given notice that the conduct will no longer be
tolerated, further violations could result in a denial of benefits,
d

* Culpability may be established even if the result of the violation of
the rule does not in and of itself cause harm to the employer, but the resultant
lack of compliance with rules diminishes the employer's ability to have order
and control. Culpability is established if termination of the employee was
required to maintain necessary discipline in the company.
e

* Knowledge of the employer's standards of behavior is usually provided in the form of verbal instructions, written rules and/or warnings. However,
a warning is not always necessary for a disqualification to apply in cases of
violations of a serious nature of universal standards of conduct of which the
claimant should have been aware without being warned.
2.

Attendance Violations

a. It is the duty of the worker to be punctual and remain at work within
the reasonable requirements of the employer. Discharge for unjustified absence
or tardiness is considered disqualifying if the worker knows that he is violating attendance rules. Such violations are generally a serious matter of concern to employers as attendance standards are necessary to maintain order,
control, and productivity. Discharge for an attendance violation beyond the
control of the worker is not disqualifying unless the worker reasonably could
have given notice or obtained permission consistent with the employer's rules.
b. In cases of termination for violations of attendance standards, the
employee's recent history of attendance shall be considered to determine if the
violation is an isolated incident, or demonstrates a pattern of unjustified
absences within the control of the employee. Flagrant misuse of attendance
privileges may result in a denial of benefits even if the last incident was
beyond the employee's control.
3.

Falsification of Work Record

The duty of honesty is inherent in any employee/employer relationship,
A statement made in an application for a job may be considered as connected
with the work, even though it is made before the work begins. An individual
begins his obligations as an employee when he makes an application for work.
One of those obligations is to give the employer truthful answers to all
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aterial questions.
Any falsification of information which may operate to
xpose the employer to possible loss, litigation, or damage would be considered
aterial and therefore may establish culpability.
If the claimant made a
alse statement while applying for work in order to be hired, benefits may be
enied even if the claimant would have otherwise remained unemployed and
ligible for the receipt of unemployment benefits depending upon the degree of
nowledge, culpability and control.
4.

Insubordination

Authority is required in the work place to maintain order and efficiency,
n employer has the right to expect that lines of authority will be maintained;
hat reasonable orders, given in a civil manner, will be obeyed; that supervisors
ill be respected and that their authority will not be undermined. In deterining when insubordination (resistance to authority) becomes disqualifying
onduct, the fact that there was a disregard of the employer's interests is of
ajor importance. Mere protests or dissatisfaction without an overt act is not
n disregard of the employer's interests. However, provocative remarks to a
uperior or vulgar or profane language in response to a civil request may be
nsubordination if it is conducive to disruption of routine, negation of authorty and impairment of efficiency. Mere incompatability or emphatic insistence
r discussion by an employee who was acting in good faith is not disqualifying
onduct.
5.

Loss of License

When an employee loses a license which he knows is required for the
erformance of the job, and the individual had control over the circumstances
hich resulted in the loss of the license, such conduct is disqualifying. For
xample, if the claimant worked as a driver, and lost his license because of a
onviction for driving under the influence (DUI), culpability is established
f he fails to obtain a permit to drive at work or the conviction would expose
he employer to additional liabilities.
The employer cannot authorize an
mployee to drive in violation of the law. Also, additional insurance costs or
ther liabilities are a legitimate concern of the employer.
Knowledge is
stablished because it is a matter of common knowledge in the state of Utah
hat driving under the influence of alcohol is a violation of the law and is
unishable by loss of the individual's driving privileges. Judicial notice can
e taken of this fact because a question relative to this matter is on eyery
river's license test. He had control in that he made a conscious decision to
isk loss of the license when he failed to make arrangements for transportation
rior to becoming under the influence of intoxicants.
. EFFECTIVE DATE OF DISQUALIFICATION
The Act provides that any disqualification under this section will include
the week in which the claimant was discharged . • ." However, to avoid conusion, the denial of benefits will begin with the Sunday of the week for which
he claimant has filed for benefits.

§ 395.2

ederal Highway Administration, DOT
terns 27 through 27B: Mark appropriate
boxes to Indicate road surface condition,
number of lanes, and If the highway was
divided by a median or curbing.
Rem 27C: Mark appropriate box.
Item 28: An account of the accident containing the most reliable Information to
which the motor carrier has access at
the time of reporting, sufficiently detailed and complete to convey an understanding of his version of the accident
shall be entered under this Item. This
account should be continued on an extra
sheet of paper If more space if needed.
Item 29: JPrint or type name and title of
person signing report.
Items 30, 31 and 32: Complete appropriate
entries. In Item 31 include area code.
137 FR 22868. Oct. 26, 1972]
PART 395—HOURS OF SERVICE OF
DRIVERS
See.
395.1 CompHance with, and knowledge of,
the rules In this part.
395.2 Definitions.
395.3 Maximum driving and on-duty time.
395.7 Travel time.
395.8 Driver's record of duty status.
395.10 Adverse driving conditions.
395.11 Emergency conditions.
395.12 Relief from regulations.
395.13 Drivers declared out c* service.
AUTHORITY: Sec.

204. 49 Stat. 546,

as

amended; 49 U.S.C. 304, unless otherwise
noted.
SOURCE: 33 FR 19758, Dec. 25, 1968, unless
otherwise noted.
§395.1 CompHance with, and knowledge
of, the rules in this part.
(a) General Except as provided In
paragraph (b) of this section, every
motor carrier and Its officers, drivers,
agents, employees, and representatives
shall comply with the rules In this
part, and every motor carrier shall require that Its officers, drivers, agents,
employees, and representatives be conversant with the rules in this part.
(b) Lightweight
mail tntcks.
7iie
rules In this part do not apply to a
driver who drives only a motor vehicle
that—
(1) Is used exclusively to transport
mail under contract with the U.S.
Postal Service; and
(2) Has a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or
less.

[37 FR 26113, Dec. 8, 1972]
§ 395.2

Definitions.

As used In this part, the following
words and terms are construed to
mean:
(a) On-duty time. All time from the
time a driver begins to work or Is required to be in readiness to work until
the time he is relieved from work and
all responsibility for performing work.
The term "On-duty" time shall Include:
(1) All time at a carrier or shipper
plant, terminal, facility, or other property, or on any public property, waiting to be dispatched, unless the driver
has been relieved from duty by the
motor carrier.
(2) All time inspecting equipment as
required by §§ 392.7 and 392.8 or otherwise inspecting, servicing, or conditioning any motor vehicle at any time;
(3) All driving time as defined In
paragraph (b) of this section;
(4) All time, other than driving time,
In or upon any motor vehicle except
time spent resting in a sleeper berth as
defined in paragraph (g) of this section;
(5) All time loading or unloading a
vehicle, supervising, or assisting In the
loading or unloading, attending a vehicle being loaded or unloaded, remaining in readiness to operate the vehicle,
or in giving or receiving receipts for
shipments loaded or unloaded;
(6) All time spent performing the
driver requirements of §§392.40 and
392.41 relating to accidents;
(7) All time repairing, obtaining assistance, or remaining In attendance
upon a disabled vehicle;
(8) Performing any other work in
the capacity of, or in the employ or
service of, a common, contract or private motor carrier.
(b) Driving time. The terms "drive"
and "driving time" shall include all
time spent at the driving controls of a
motor vehicle in operation.
(c) Seven consecutive days. The term
"7 consecutive days" means the period
of 7 consecutive days beginning on any
day at the time designated by the
motor carrier for a 24-hour period.
(d) Eight consecutive days. The term
"8 consecutive days" means the period
of 8 consecutive days beginning on any
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3
it the time designated by the
carrier for a 24-hour period.
Twenty-four hour period. The
"24-hour period" means any 24
3utive hour period beginning at
me designated by the motor caror the terminal from which the
is normally dispatched.
Regularly employed driver. The
"regularly employed dilver"
i a driver who in any period of 7
Mitlve days is employed or used
jrlver solely by a single motor
r.
Weeper beith. The term "sleeper
means a berth conforming to
>quirements of § 393.76 of this
ipter.
Driver-salesman.
The trim
r salesman" means any employ) Is employed solely as such by a
2 cairier of property by motor
3, who Is engaged both in selling
services, or the use of goods,
delivering by motor vehicle the
sold or provided or upon which
rvices are performed, who does
rely within a radius of 100 miles
point at which he reports for
who devotes not more than 50
t of his hours on duty to driving
The term "selling goods" for
;es of this subsection shall inn all cases solicitation or obtainreorders or new accounts, and
Iso include other selling or merslng activities designed to retain
stomer or to Increase the snle of
or services, In addition to soliclor obtaining of reorders or new
its.
r
ultiple stops. All stops made In
»e village, town, or city may be
ted as one.
Principal place of business or
office addtess. The pilncipal
of business or main office ads the geographic location deslgby the motor carrier where the
; required to be maintained by
rt will be made available for Inn.
!.C. 304, 1653; 49 CFR 1.48 and
19758, Dec. 25, 1968, as amended at
46424, J u l y 10, 1980; 47 FJR 53389,
1982J

§395.3

Maximum

driving

and

on-duty

time.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs
(c) and (e) of this section and in
§ 395.10, no motor carrier shall permit
or require any driver used by it to
drive nor shall any such driver drive:
(1) More than 10 hours following 8
consecutive hours off duty; or
(2) For any period after having been
on duty 15 hours following 8 consecutive hours off duty.
(3) Exemption: Drivers using sleepe
berth equipment as defined it
5 395.2(g), or who are off duty at a nat
ural gas or oil well location, may cu
mulate the required 8 consecutiv<
hours off duty resting In a sleepei
berth In two separate periods totaling
8 hours, neither period to be less thar
2 hours, or resting while off duty ir
other sleeping accommodations at i
natural gas or oil well location.
(b) Except as provided In paragraph
(e) of this section, no motor carriei
shall permit or require any driver used
by it to be on duty, nor shall any sucli
driver be on duty, more than 60 hours
in any 7 consecutive days as defined In
§ 395.2(c) regardless of the number oi
motor carriers using the driver's services. Provided, however, That carriers
operating vehicles every day in the
week may permit drivers to remain on
duty for a total of not more than 70
hours in any period of 8 consecutive
days. Provided further, however, That
the limitations of this paragraph shall
not apply with respect to any driversalesman whose total driving time does
not exceed 40 hours In any 7 consecutive days.
(c) The provisions of paragraph (a)
of this section shall not apply with respect to drivers used wholly in driving
motor vehicles having not more than 2
axles and whose gross weight, as defined in § 390.10, does not exceed
10,000 pounds, unless such vehicle Is
used to transport passengers or explosives or other dangerous article"? of
such type and In such quantity as to
require the vehicle to be specifically
marked or placarded under the Hazardous
Materials
Regulations,
§ 177.823 of this title, or when operated without cargo under conditions
which require the vehicle to be so
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marked or placarded under the cited
regulations: Provided further, however,
That this section shall not apply with
respect to drivers of motor vehicles engaged solely in making deliveries for
retail stores during the period from
December 10 to December 25, both inclusive, of each year.
(d) In the Instance of drivers of
motor vehicles used exclusively in the
transportation ot oilfield equipment,
including the stringing and picking up
of pipe used in pipelines, and servicing
of the field operations of the natural
gas and oil industry, any period of 8
consecutive days may end with the beginning of any off-duty period of 24 or
more successive hours.
(e) A driver who Is driving a motor
vehicle in the State of Alaska must
not drive or be permitted to drive
more than 15 hours following 8 consecutive hours off duty. A driver who
is driving a motor vehicle in the State
of Alaska must not drive or be permitted to drive after he has been on duty
for 20 hours or more following 8 consecutive hours off duty. A driver who
drives a motor vehicle in the State of
Alaska must not be on duty or be permitted to be on duty more than—
(1) 70 hours in any period of 7 consecutive days, If the carrier for whom
he drives does not opeiate every day In
the week; or
(2) 80 hours in any period of 8 consecutive days, If the carrier for whom
he drives operates every day in the
week.
(f) In the case of specially trained
drivers of specially constructed oil well
servicing vehicles, on-duty time shall
not include waiting time at a natural
gas or oil well site; Provided, That all
such time shall fully and accurately
accounted for In records to be maintained by the motor carrier. Such
records shall be made available upon
request of the Federal Highway Administration.

counted as on-duty time unless the
driver is afforded at least 8 consecutive hours off duty when arriving at
destination, in which case he shall be
considered off duty for the entire
period.

[33 F R 10758, Dec. 25, 1060, as amended at
36 FR 20360, Oct. 21, 1071; 45 FH 46424 and
46425, J u l y 10, 1080J
§395.7

Travel time.

When a driver at the direction of a
motor carrier Is traveling, but not driving or assuming any other responsibility to the carrier, such time shall be

§ 395.8 Driver's record of duty status.
(a) Every motor carrier shall require
every driver used by the motor carrier
to record his/her duty status, in duplicate, for each 24-hour period. Every
driver who operates a motor vehicle
shall record his/her duty status, in duplicate, for each 24-hour period. The
duty status time shall be recorded on a
specified grid, as shown in paragraph
(g) of this section. The grid and the requirements of paragraph (d) of this
section may be combined with any
company forms. The previously approved format of the Daily Log, Form
MCS-59 or the Multi-day Log, MCS139 and MCS-139A, which meets the
requirements of this paragraph, may
continue to be used.
(b) The duty status shall be recorded
as follows:
(1) "Off duty" or "OFF."
(2) "Sleeper berth" or "SB" (only if
a sleeper berth used).
(3) "Driving" or "D."
(4) "On-duty not driving" or "ON."
(c) For each change of duty status
(e.g., the place of reporting for work,
starting to drive, on-duty not driving
and where released from work), the
name of the city, town, or village, with
State abbreviation, shall be recorded.
NOTE: If a change of duty status occurs at
a location other than a city, town, or village,
show one of the following: (1) The highway
number and nearest mllepost followed by
the name of the nearest city, town, or village and State abbreviation, (2) the highway
number and the name of the service plaza
followed by the name of the nearest city,
town, or village and State abbreviation, or
(3) the highway numbers of the nearest two
Intersecting roadways followed by the name
of the nercst city, town, or village and State
abbreviation.
(d) The following Information must
be included on the form in addition to
the grid:
(l)Date;
(2) Total miles driving today;
(3) Truck or tractor and trailer
number;
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be shown after each carrier name.
Drivers of leased vehicles shall show
the name of the motor carrier performing the transportation.
(7) Signatui e/cei tification.
The
driver shall certify to the correctness
of all entries by signing the form containing the driver's duty status record
with his/her legal name or name of
record. The driver's signature certifies
that all entries required by this seclipping document number(s), tion made by the driver are true and
of shipper and commodity;
correct.
Jgln; and
(8) Time base to be used, (i) The drivDestination or turnaround er's duty status record shall be prepared, maintained, and submitted
lure to complete the record of using the time standard in effect at
Ivltles, failure to preserve a the driver's home terminal, for a 24>f such duty activities, or hour period beginning with the time
)f false reports In connection specified by the motor carrier for that
ti duty activities as prescribed driver's home terminal.
ball make the driver and/or
(li) The term "7 or 8 consecutive
er liable to prosecution.
days" means the 7 or 8 consecutive 24> driver's activities shall be re- hour periods as designated by the carI accordance with the follow- rier for the driver's home terminal.
slons:
(ill) The 24-hour period starting time
tries to be current. Drivers must be identified on the driver's duty
p their record of duty status
record. One-hour increments
o the time shown for the last status
must appear on the giaph, be Identif duty status.
preprinted. The words "Midtics made by driver only. All fied, and
and "Noon" must appear above
Anting to driver's duty status night"
or beside the appropriate one-hour ineglble and In the driver's own crement.
Ing.
(9) Main office address. The motor
e. The month, day and year
beginning of each 24-hour carrier's main office address shall be
mil be shown on the form shown on the form containing the
g the driver's duty status driver's duty status record.
(10) Recording days off duty. Two or
xl mileage diiven. Total mlle- more consecutive 24-hour periods off
n during the 24-hour period duty may be recorded on one duty
ecorded on the form contain- status record.
(11) Total mileage today. Total mileriver's duty status record.
icle identification. The carri- age today shall be that mileage travole number or State and 11- eled while driving, on duty not driving,
imber of each truck, truck and resting in a sleeper berth, as demd trailer operated dining fined in S 395.2(g) during the day covour period shall be shown on ered by the record of duty status.
containing the driver's duty
(12) Home teiinlnal The driver's
ord.
home terminal address shown shall be
ie of carrier. The name(s) of that at which the driver normally rer carrler(s) for which work is ports for duty.
d shnll be shown on the form
(13) Total hours. The total hours In
g the driver's duty status each duty status: off duty other than
/hen work is performed for in a sleeper berth; off duty in a sleeper
n one motor carrier during berth; driving, and on duty not driv24-hour period, the begin- ing, shall be entered to the right of
finlshing time, showing a.m. the grid, the total of such entries shall
vorked for each carrier shall equal 24 hours.

ne of carrier;
ver's signature/certification;
hour period starting time (e.g.
t, 9:00 a.m., noon, 3:00 p.m.);
In office address;
narks;
,al mileage today;
ime of co-driver;
mie terminal address;
otal hours (far right edge of

i
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(14) Shipping document number(s),
or name of shipper and commodity
shall be shown on the driver's record
of duty status.
(15) OHgin and destination. The
name of the place where a trip begins
and the final destination or farthest
turn-around point shall be shown. If
the trip requires more than 1 calendar
day, the record of duty status for each
day shall show the original and final
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destination. If a driver departs from
and returns to the same place on any
day, the destination shall be Indicated
by entering the farthest point reached
followed by the words "and return".
(g) Graph grid. The following graph
grid must be Incorporated Into a motor
carrier recordkeeping system which
must also contain the Information required In paragraph (d) of this section1. *

49 CfR Ch. Iff (10-1-85 Edition)
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(h) Graph grid preparation.
The
graph grid may be used horizontally
or vertically and shall be completed as
follows:
(1) Off duly. Except for time spent
resting In a sleeper beith, a continuous line shall be drawn between the
appropilate time markers to record
the peilod(s) of time when the driver
Is not on duty, Is not required to be In
readiness to work, or Is not under any
responsibility for performing work.
(2) Sleeper berlh. A continuous line
shall be drawn between the appropilate time maikers to record the
period(s) of time off duty resting In a
sleeper berth, as defined In § 395.2(g).
(If a non sleeper berth operation,
sleeper berth need not be shown on
the grid.)
(3) Driving. A continuous line shall
be dtawn between the appropilate
time markers to recoid the peiiod(s)
of time on duty driving a motor vehicle, as defined In § 395 2(b).
(4) On duly not driving. A continuous line shall be diawn between the
appropilate time markers to recoid
the perlod(s) of time on duty not driving specified In § 395.2(a).
(5) Location—remarks.
The name of
the city, town, or village, with State
abbreviation where each change of
duty status occurs shall be recorded.
NOTF* If a change of duty status occurs at
a location other than a city, town, or village,
show one of the following: (1) The highway
number and nearest mllepost followed by
the name of the nearest city, town, or village and State abbreviation, (2) the highway
number and the name of the service plaza
followed by the name of the nearest city,
town, or village and State abbreviation, or
(3) the highway numbers of the nearest two
intersecting roadways followed by the name
of the nearest city, town, or village and
State abbreviation.
(I) Filing driver's record of duty
status. The dilver shall submit or forward by mall the original diiver's
record of duty status to the regular
employing motor carrier within 13
days following the completion of the
form.
(J) Drivers used by more than one
motor carrier. (1) When the services of
a driver are used by more than one
motor cariler duiing any 24-hour
period In effect at the driver's home

terminal, the driver shall submit a
copy of the record of duty status to
each motor carrier. The record shall
include:
(i) All duty time for the entire 24hour period; ,
(ii) The name of each motor carrier
served by the driver during that
K
period; and
l
(ill) The beginning and finishing
time, including a.m. or p.m., worked
for each carrier.
(2) Motor caniers, when using a
driver for the first time or intermittently, shall obtain from the driver a
signed statement giving the total time
on duty during the immediately preceding 7 days and the time at which
the driver was last relieved from duty
prior to beginning work for the motor
carrieis.
(k) Retention
of driver's record of
duty status. (1) Diiver's records of
duty status for each calendar month
may be retained at the driver's home
terminal until the 20th day of the succeeding calendar month. Such records
shall then be forwarded to the carrier's principal place of business where
they shall be retained with all supp o s i n g documents for a period of 6
months from date of receipt.
(2) Exception. Upon written request
to, and with the approval of, the Associate Regional Administrator
for
Motor Carrier Safety for the region in
which the motor carrier has its prlncl
pal place of business, a motor carriei
may forward and maintain sucli
records at a regional or termlna
office. The addresses and jurisdiction.'
of the Associate Regional Admlnlstra
tor's offices are shown in 5 390.40 o
this subchapter.
(3) The driver shall retain a copy o
each record of duty status for the pre
vious 7 consecutive days which shal
be in his/her possession and avallabl
for inspection while on duty.
NOTE: Driver's Record of Duty Status.
The graph grid, when Incorporated as pa
of any form used by a motor carrier, tnu
be of sufficient size to be legible.
The following executed specimen grid
lustrates how a driver's duty status shou
be recorded for a trip from Richmond, VI
glnla, to Newark, New Jersey. The grid t
fleets the midnight to midnight 24 ho
period.
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10

Id (Midnight to Midnight
Operation)
n t!ds Instance reported for
lotor carrier's terminal. The
I for work at 8 a.m., helped
villi dispatch, made a pretrlp
performed other duties until
the driver began driving. At
/er hnd a minor accident In
Virginia, and spent one half
details with the local police.
Ivcd at the company's Baltli, terminal at noon and went
minor repairs were made to
, 1 p.m. the driver resumed
lade a delivery In Phlladeltnla, between 3 p.m. and 3:30
me the driver started driving
rrlval at Cherry Hill, New
m., the driver entered the
>r a rest break until 5:45 p.m.
the driver resumed driving
n. the driver arrived at the
ilnal In Newaik, New Jersey.
and 8 p.m. the driver preulred paperwork Including
; driver's record of duty
condition report, Insurance
Yederlcksburg, Virginia acclor the next day's dispatch,
ie driver went off duty.
fott$—(l)
100
air-mile
A d i i v e r Is e x e m p t f r o m

nts of this section If:
er operates within a 100
3 of the normal work re>n;
er, except a driver salesis to the work reporting
Is released from work
8 consecutive hours off
each 12 hours on duty;

tl

MOON 1

(lv) The driver does not exceed 10
hours maximum dilvlng time following 8 consecutive hours off duty;
(v) The motor carrier that employs
the driver maintains and retains for a
period of 6 months accurate and true
time records showing:
(A) The time the driver reports for
duty each day;
(B) The total number of hours the
driver Is on duty each day;
(C) The time the driver Is released
from duty each day; and
(D) The total time for the preceding
7 days In accordnnce with paragraph
(j)(2) of this section for drivers used
for the first time or Intermittently.
(2) Drivers of lightweight vehicles.
The rules In this section do not apply
to a driver of a lightweight vehicle as
defined In § 390.17.
(3) Drivers operating in Hawaii. The
rules In this section do not apply to a
driver who drives a motor vehicle in
the State of Hawaii, if the motor carrier who employs the driver maintains
and retains for a period of 6 months
accurate and true records showing—
(i) The total number of hours the
driver is on duty each day; and
(ii) The time at which the driver reports for, and Is released, from, duty
each day.
(Approved by the Office of Management
and Budget under control number 21250018)
(40 U.S.C. 304, 1853; 49 CFU 1.48 and 301,80;
40 U.S.C. 3102; 40 CFU 1.48(b))
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[47 FR 53389, Nov. 26, 1982, as amended at
49 mi 38290, Sept. 28, 1984; 49 FR 46147,
Nov. 23, 1984J

or from any section of the country
with the object of providing relief in
case of earthquake, flood, fire. 'amine,
drought, epidemic, pestilence, or other
calamitous visitation or disaster.

6 395.10

Adverse driving conditions.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(b) of this section, a driver who encounters adverse driving conditions (as
defined in paragraph (c) of this section) and cannot, because of those conditions, safely complete the run within
the 10 hour maximum driving time
permitted by 9 395.3(a) may drive and
be permitted or required to drive a
motor vehicle for not more than 2 additional hours in order to complete
that run or to reach a place offering
safety for vehicle occupants and security for the vehicle and lis cargo. However, that driver may not drive or be
permitted or requited to drive—
(1) For more than 12 hours in the
aggregate following 8 consecutive
hours off duty; or
(2) After he has been on duty 15
hours following 8 consecutive hours
off duty.
(b) A driver who Is driving a motor
vehicle in the State of Alaska and who
encounters adverse driving conditions
(as defined In paragraph (c) of this
section) may drive and be permitted or
required to drive a motor vehicle for
the period of time needed to complete
the run. After he completes the run,
that driver must be off duty for 8 consecutive hours before he drives again.
(c) "Adverse driving conditions"
means snow, sleet, fog, other adverse
weather conditions, a highway covered
with snow or Ice, or unusual road and
traffic conditions, none of which were
apparent on the basis of Information
known to the person dispatching the
run at the time it was begun.
[38 FR 1590, Jan. 18, 19731
§395.11

Emergency conditions.

In case of any emergency, a driver
may complete his run without being In
violation of the provisions of these
regulations, if such run could reasonably have been completed without
such violation.
§ 395.12 Relief from regulations.
These regulations shall not apply to
any carrier subject thereto when
transporting passengers or property to

§ 395.13 Drivers declared out of service.
(a) Authority to declare drivers out
of service. Every special agent of the
Federal Highway Administration (as
defined In Appendix B to this subchapter) is authorized to declare a
driver out of service and to notify the
motor carrier of that declaration,
upon finding at the time and place of
examination that the driver has violated the out of service criteria as set
forth in paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) Out of service criteria. (1) No
driver shall drive after being on duty
in excess of the maximum periods permitted by this part.
(2) )$o driver required to maintain a
record of duty status under J 395 8
shall fail to have a record of duty
status current on the day of examination and for the prior 7 consecutive
days.
(3) Exception, A driver falling only
to have possession of a record of duty
status current on the day of exarnina
tion and the prior day, but has com
pleted records of duty status up tc
that time (previous 6 days), will be
given the opportunity to make the
duty status record current.
(c) Responsibilities
of motor carri
eis. (1) No motor carrier shall:
(i) Require or permit a driver whe
has been declared out of service to op
erate a motor vehicle until that drive)
may lawfully do under the rules h
this part.
(II) Require a driver who has beer
declared out of service for failure t<
prepare a record of duty status to op
erate a motor vehicle until that drive
has been off duty for 8 consecutiv
hours and Is in compliance with thi
section. The consecutive 8 hour of!
duty period may include sleeper bertl
time.
(2) A motor carrier shall complet
the "Motor Carrier Certification c
Action Taken" portion of the forr
MCS-63 (Driver-Vehicle Examinatio
Report) and deliver the copy of th
form either personally or by mail t
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sociatc Regional Administrator
otor Cnrrier Safety, Federal
\y Administration, at the adpccifled upon the form within
following the date of examinaF the motor canier mails the
olivery is made on the date it is
rked.
csponsibilities
of the driver. (1)
'er who has been declared out
Ice shall operate a motor vehiil that driver may lawfully do
r the rules of this part,
i driver who has been declared
service, for foiling to prepare a
of duty status, shall opeiate a
vehicle until the driver has
f duty for 8 consecutive houts
i compliance with this section.
driver to whom a form has
idercd declaring the driver out
:e shall within 24 hours thereOliver or mail the copy to a
or place designated by motor
o receive it.
ction 395.13 does not alter the
us materials requirements preIn § 397.5 peitaining to attendd surveillance of motor vehi304, 1655(e); 49 CFR 1.48 and
1963, June 18, 1979, as amended at
192, Nov. 26, 1982]
396—INSPECTION, REPAIR,
AND MAINTENANCE
>pe.

pcctlon, repair, and maintenance.
jrlentlon.
«mfe operations forbidden.
pectlon of motor vehicles in operrlver vehicle Inspection rcport(s).
river inspection.
-Iveaway-towaway operations, inms.
TY: Pec. 204, 49 Stat. 540, as
(49 U.S.C. 304), sec. 6, Tub. L. 89at. 937 (49 U.S.C. 1655); 49 CFR
0).
44 FR 38526, July 2, 1979, unless
noted.
*ope.
era?—Every motor canier, its
drivers, agents, representad employees directly con-

cerned with the inspection or maintenance of motor vehicles shall comply
and be conveisant with the rules of
this part.
(b) Exemption—il)
Intraeity
operations. The rules In this part do not
apply to a driver or vehicle wholly engaged in exempt Intraeity operations
as defined In § 390.10 of this subchapter.
(2) Lightweight
mail trucks. The
rules In this part do not apply to a
motor carrier or driver engaged In
transporting mail under contract with
the U.S. Postal Service in motor vehicles having a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating of 4,535 kg (10,000
pounds) or less.
§ 396.3 Inspection, rcpnir, and maintenance.
(a) General—Every
motor carrier
shall systematically Inspect, repair,
and maintain, or cause to be systematically inspected, repaired, and maintained, all motor vehicles subject to its
control.
(1) Parts and accessories shall be In
safe and proper operating condition at
all times. These include those specified In Part 393 of this subchapter and
any additional parts and accessories
which may affect safety of operation,
including but not limited to, frame
and frame assemblies, suspension systems, axles and attaching parts,
wheels and rims, and steering systems.
(2) Pushout windows, emergency
doors, and emergency door marking
lights in buses shall be Inspected at
least every 90 days.
(b) Required records—For vehicles
controlled for 30 consecutive days or
more, the motor carriers shall maintain, or cause to be maintained, the
following records for each vehicle:
(1) An identification of the vehicle
including company number, If so
marked, make, serial number, year,
and tire size. In addition, if the motor
vehicle is not owned by the motor carrier, the record shall Identify the
name of the person furnishing the vehicle;
(2) A means to indicate the nature
and due date of the vaiious inspection
and maintenance operations to be performed;
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BOARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Unemployment Compensation Appeals
MICHAEL F. GRINNELL
S.S.A. No. 304 62 5299
vs.

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

SMII/TK/LRB/mgn

J
:

Case No.

:

DECISION

:

Case No.

86-A-563

86-BR-106

:

After careful consideration of the record and testimony In the
above-entitled matter, the Board of Review hereby reverses the decision of
the Administrative Law Judge which allowed benefits to the claimant effective December 29, 1905, pursuant to §35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment
Security Act, on the grounds the claimant was discharged from his employment but not for conduct which 1s disqualifying under the provisions of
§35-4~5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act; and held the employer,
May Trucking Company, liable for benefit charges 1n connection with this
claim. Benefits are denied to the claimant effective December 29, 1905
and continuing until he has worked 1n bona fide covered employment and
earned wages equal to at least six times his weekly benefit amount and Is
otherwise eligible, on the grounds the claimant was discharged from his
employment for conduct which 1s disqualifying under the provisions of
§35~4-5(b)(l) of the Act. This disqualification establishes an overpayment
In the amourrV of $1,351, pursuant to §35~4-6(e) of the Act, which must be
offset by future benefits to which the claimant may become eligible during
his current benefit year. The employer, May Trucking Company, Is relieved
of benefit charges 1n connection with this claim.
In reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the
Board of Review notes that the claimant was discharged from his employment after returning from a trip when the employer learned: (1) that the
truck's road speed governor had been altered to.allow driving In excess of
the 62-mile per hour maximum speed the governor would have allowed,' (2)
noted that the on-board computer showed the truck had averaged about 66
miles per hour. (3) that the claimant had operated his vehicle for nearly
22 hours out ot a 24-hour period, which 1s clearly a violation of both the
United States Department of Transportation Hours of Service Regulations and
company policy; and (4) on a urinalysis test for drug usage he was found
to have used a controlled substance (marijuana).
The Board of Review acknowledges that there may well be 1nsufflent evidence respecting the claimant's use of marijuana to demonstrate
when the claimant had actually used the drug or what effect, 1f any, the
use of the drug had upon his driving ability. Nevertheless, the Board of
Review does not accept the ALJ's conclusion that the claimant's discharge
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should be adjudicated solely on the basis of the evidence respecting the
claimant's use of marijuana. The employer clearly testified that 1t was
the cumulative effect of all of the above-listed factors which resulted In
a decision to terminate the claimant. The employer has noted 1n Its appeal
that the number of hours which the claimant drove In a 24-hour period
exceeded double the federal permissible limit and at speeds substantially
1n excess of the maximum speed limit. Moreover, these violations of company policy, as well as state and federal laws, were not just isolated
incidents that had accumulated over the period of the claimant's employment, but rather were an accumulation of evidence respecting the claimant's
conduct on the last trip he drove for the employer. The fact that It took
the employer several days to accumulate and evaluate the evidence cannot
be used as a..b$s1s for looking only at the strength or weakness of the
last evidence obtained 1n making the determination of whether the claimant
should be disqualified under the provisions of §35-4-5(b)(l) of the Act
and entirely disregarding the more substantial evidence respecting other
acts that were part of the same Incident.
This decision will become final ten days after the date of mailing hereof, and any further appeal must be made directly with the Utah
Supreme Court at the State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, within
ten days after this decision becomes final. To file an appeal with the
Supreme Court, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for
Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35-4-10(1)
of the Utah Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing Statement and
a Legal Brief.
/S/
/S/

Stephen M. Iladley
James F. Hannan

I dissent.
I don't feel that the urinalysis test for drug usage results were
that conclusive, particularly where they were taken nearly a week after the
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claimant's return from the t r i p . Moreover, I do not find that the claimant's driving 66 miles per hour, which admittedly is in violation of the
law, 1s that appreciably higher than 62 miles an hour, also In violation of
the law, which the employer basically authorized as evidenced by the fact
that that's the speed at which the governor was set.

/S/

Don S. Belka
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The Department's decision dated January 24, 1986 denied unemployment Insurance
benefits effective December 29, 1986 on the grounds the claimant was discharged
for just cause. Section 3 5 - 4 ~ 5 ( b ) ( l ) and 3 5 - 4 - 7 ( c ) ( 3 ) ( F ) of the Utah Employment
Security Act are quoted on the attached sheet.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Prior to f i l i n g a claim for unemployment Insurance benefits effective December 29,
1985, the claimant worked as a tractor t r a i l e r driver for May Trucking Company from
September 20, 1984 to December 19, 1985. His weekly benefit amount Is $193.00 for
26 weeks.
The claimant was discharged when he was determined to have traces of the drug
marijuana 1n his system., After returning from a t r i p , a mechanic reported to the
employer the dashboard on the claimant's truck had been removed and an a i r control
valve on the governor had been altered. The governor controlled the truck's
speed to below 62 miles per hour.
An on board computor 'showed the truck had
averaged about 66 miles per hour. When confronted about the problem, the claimant
told the safety director, he, had a i r brake problems:: and he had t r i e d fto correct
t h e ; d i f f i c u l t i e s . J While• the^nvestlgatlon^lnto the a1r v valve was belng'conducted;
the safety director discovered the claimant had recorded an excessive driving
time on his log. -He had shown nearly 22 hours of driving time 1n a 24 hour
period. The claimant had violated ICC standards by driving without taking proper
break time. He was put on suspension as a result of the two Incidents and the
safety director ordered him to take a physical examination and a urine analysis
because there was a serious question as to his a b i l i t y to drive the extended time
period without using amphetamines or other such drugs. The urine analysis established he had the trace of marijuana 1n his system. The claimant was discharged
at that time.
The employer's policy prohibited the use of drugs or alcohol while employed by the
company, but there was no written rules available to explain the d e t a i l s of the
policy. The safety director f e l t the rule applied to a driver regardless of when
the drugs were used, the claimant understood the rule was violated i f the driver
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consumed the substances while In or around a truck or under the Influence of
the substances while operating the vehicle. He had consumed the drug about two
to three weeks before the test was administered and he had not used the substance
regularly. The urine analysis test had been conducted by a local laboratory, but
there was no Information available to explain what Influence the amount of drug
In the claimant's system might have had on the claimant.
The claimant had a good performance record with the employer and he had not had
any prior disciplinary problems. Due to his record, the employer had chosen to
give him a suspension following the Incidents Involving the governor and the
ICC violation of excessive driving time rather than discharge him.
REASONING AND CONCLUSION OF LAW:
A denial of unemployment Insurance benefits following a discharge 1s based on a
fault concept, as explained 1n the following decision:
When an employee 1s discharged by his employer, such discharge msy have been the result of Incompetence, lack of
skill, or other reasons which are clearly beyond the
claimant's control. The fact of willful or wanton conduct
Is not established merely by the claimant's knowledge that
he Is violating a reasonable rule of the employer; rather,
1t must be shown from the evidence that the claimant knew
or had reason to know that his conduct may result 1n loss
of employment. (Utah Board of Review, 80-BR-322.)
In the present case, the evidence clearly established the claimant's discharge
was the result of the discovery of a drug 1n his system and the other incidents
were not the primary reason for the termination. The employer was justified In
having a policy designed to control and eliminate the problems of drug or alcohol
used among Its truck drivers, but 1n this Instance there 1s substantial confusion
as to the understanding of that rule and the application of the rule \n the
claimant's case. The claimant testified credibly that he-had not consumed the
drug for a considerable amount of time and he was not a regular user of the drug.
He understood he was not 1n violation of the rule unless the drug had an influence,
on his driving performance or he had consumed the drug 1n or around a company
vehicle. There was Insufficient evidence provided* to support the employer's
contention the claimant knew he would be terminated for any use of drugs and the
employer did not meet Its burden of proof In this case to show the claimant had
knowledge he would lose his job under the circumstances. It 1s therefore concluded
the claimant was not discharged for just cause 1n accordance with the Utah Employment Security Act.
It Is noted this decision does not attempt to determine the reasonableness of the
employer's rule.
The Utah Employment Security Act relieves an employer of charges for unemployment
Insurance benefits when the claimant was discharged for reasons which are disqualifying under Section 35~4-5(b) of the Act. The Act does not grant relief when the
reason for the discharge would not have resulted \r\ a disqualification, even 1f the
discharge resulted from circumstances over which the employer had no control. In
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s case, the claimant was not discharged for disqualifying
loyer 1s f therefore, I n e l i g i b l e for r e l i e f of charges.

reasons and the

ISION:

decision of the Department Representative Is reversed and benefits are allowed
ectlve December 29, 1905 pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employit Security Act provided the claimant was otherwise eligible.
employer, May Trucking Company, 1s not relieved of charges as provided by
tlon 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Utah Employment Security Act and 1s .liable for its
)-rated share of benefit costs paid to this claimant.

~l e
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Administrative Vm /TJcJge
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
1s decision w i l l become final unless within ten days from February 26. 1906,
irther written appeal 1s made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 1 VCDO, Salt LakV
t y , Utah 83T37) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal Is made.
tachrnent
May Truck 1ng\Company

OOll

MAY TRUCKING O
POST OFFICE BOX 218 • U\YTON, UTAH

jpV

£^3S>-??

January 16, 1986

To Whom it May Concern:
Mr. Grinnell was discharged for violation of company rules and
regulations by tampering with the equipment he operated ahd by violating
U.S. Department of Transporation Rules and Regulation by accumulating
a number of log and hours of service violations. Particular sections
he violated are DOT safety regulations 395.3 and 395.13 concerning the
amount of driving time allowed and its logging. Mr. Grinnell was suspended for only one week due to his previously exemplary employment
here. One condition to return to work is a physical exam and urinalysis.
Mr. Grinnellfs urinalysis returned positive for marijuana and subsequent testing confirmed the first analysis. Marijuana usage is in
violation of, U.S. DOT rule 392.4 at which point, Mr. Grinnell was
terminated.

Sincerely,

fjtj
Greg Weigel
Personnel Manager
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WHEAT FIELD, Attorney for the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, 1234 South Main Street, P.O. Box 11600,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 this cJjt$[

day of August, 19 86.

TED K. GODFREY
Attorney for Appellant

